## IN THE COURT OF APPELL OF TANZANIA

CORAM: MUSTAFA, AG. C.J. ; MAKANE, J.A. AND OFAR, J.A.

## CRIMINAL APPEAR NO. 24 OF 1986

I. NICOLAUS KINOVELL) 2. EDMIN LLOYS MIGLAN) ····· APPELLANTS

Versus

THE RUPUBLIC ...... RESPONDENT (Appeal from the conviction and sentence of The Migh Court of Tanzania at Iringa) (J.L. Nrosso, J.) dated 7th April, 1986

in

Criminal Sessions Case No. 63 of 1982

## JUDGE THE OF THE COURT

## MAKAPE, J.A.

The two appellants NICOLLUG KINOVELI and EDMIN HIGH. were sentenced to death by the High Court sitting at Iringa, (Froso, J), following their conviction for the murder of a man called THOBLAS MSERMA, a purchasing clerk for the Tanganyika Pyrethrum Board, stationed at Magoda in Njombe District. In the appeal before us the first appellant was represented by Ir. Hwakasungula while the second appellant was represented by Mr. Nwakasungula while the second appellant was represented by Mr. Nwakasungula agreed to represent the first appellant at very short notice and we wish to express our appreciation for Mr. Nwakasungula's valour, r. Kapinga, learned State Attorney, appeared for the respondent Republic.

The sole basis for the appellants' conviction was an extrajudicial statement the second appellant, Mlelwa, made to a Justice of the Peace, P/I3 INSGER LUGOTGO. This extra-judicial statement was retracted, and Mr. Mwakingwe's main complaint is that it should not have been relied upon to found the convictions because it was not really corroborated by other independent evidence. Mr. Mwakasungula's submission was that, in any event, his client should not have been convicted, in view of section 33(2) of the Dvidence Act, 1967. Section 33 of the Evidence let provides:

(I) When two or more persons are being tried jointly  $\dots$  and a confession of the offence or offences charged made by one of those persons affecting himself and some other of those person<sup>2</sup> the Court may take that confession into consideration against that other person.

(2) Notwithstanding sub-section (I) a conviction of an accused person shall not be based solely on a confession by a co-accused.

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On his part Mr. Kapinga, on behalf of the Republic, declined to support the convictions. He submitted that, after all, the extra judicial statement was not a confession but rather an exculpatory statement by the second appellant.

We wish to say at the outset that we are unable to uphold the trial Court's decision. While we are satisfied that the second appellant did make the statement, we are of the considered view that it does not amount to the second appellant confessing to It the most, the second appellant agreed to participation murder. in the theft of money, but there is no indication for example that the second appellant knew the theft would be in the form of a robbery where resistance would have to be overcome with violence if need be. It would appear that the second appellant agreed to participate in the theft of money, per se, but there is no evidence that he knew that the first appellant was armed with a tyre lever for the purpose. In the extra judicial statement the second appelant was saying in effect that he did not participate in the marder; so he was not confessing to the offence charged. There was no confession to rely on.

For the sake of argument, if the second appellant was confessing to murder, he retracted the confession at the trial and, as the learned trial judge appreciated, such a confession would require corroboration. The learned trial judge found such corroboration in the following pieces of circumstantial evidence, dotails which were in the extra judicial statements as well as the appellants' evidence in Court and in some cases testified to also by PN4 VENENT MGINE and DW3 TEQUELS NDERGE. Such pieces of evidence include:-

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I. The fact that the first appellant was in Magoda village and in the Deceased's company on the material day,

2. The fact that the second appellant borrowed a bicycle from PW4 and returned it at about IIpm,

3. The fact that Appellant I said he would steal money intended for the purchase of pyrethrum and such money was stolen,

4. 4. The fact that the appellant said he had arranged for DW3, the watchman, to stay away from the office he was supposed to guard and DW3 did stay away.

With due respect, while it is correct that circumstantial evidence can provide corroboration, in the instant case we do not think that the alleged confession to <u>murder</u> was corroborated by the circumstances set out.

We are of the view that there was no **meliable evidence** on which to convict the two appellants. Consequently, we allow the appeal, quash the convictions, and set aside the sentence imposed. If the appellants are not otherwise lawfully in custody they should forthwith be released.

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Before we end we wish to mention two matters, for the guidance of the Courts below. The first one is, in a trial within trial, it is the practice to number witnesses differently from the numbering in the main trial. So that in the present case, for example, in the trial within trial Col. STEVEN would be PMI, and not PWIC, and the Justice of the Peace would be PM2 and not PMIS. In the instant case if this procedure was followed there would not be the confusion there is in the record, of having PMI2 twice etc. A trial within trial is different from the main trial.


The second thing is, according to the record (Page 2I), the Justice of the Peace told the second appellant that he, the Justice of the Peace, was "a person who could take down a state ment of a person who <u>admitted</u> his guilt". This was clearly wrong. It is not the business of a Justice of the Peace to take down <u>confessions</u>. He has to take down accused persons' statements, even if they do not admit <u>guilt</u>, provided that they are voluntary. It is obvious that to tell an accused person that a Justice of the

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Peace only records the statements of persons who <u>admit guilt</u> would tend to strengthen claims, including unfounded ones, that extra judicial statements were other than voluntary.

D.TED at MBEYL this 4th day of May, 1987.

4. JUSTLEI AG. CHIEF JUSTICE



I certify that this is a true copy of the original.

app (J.H. Msoffe) DEPUTI REGISTRIR