# THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA JUDICIARY IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA MBEYA DISTRICT REGISTRY AT MBEYA CIVIL CASE NO. 1 OF 2019

MDUDE MPALUKA NYAGALIPLAINTIFF	
VERSUS	
F2820 D/CPL MWAITENDA	1 <sup>ST</sup> DEFENDANT
F6960DC BASHALE	2 <sup>ND</sup> DEFENDANT
JULIUS MKAMA	3 <sup>RD</sup> DEFENDANT
REGIONAL POLICE COMMANDER (RPC)	4 <sup>TH</sup> DEFENDANT
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (IGP)	5 <sup>TH</sup> DEFENDANT

DI ATRITTEE

#### **JUDGMENT**

ATTORNEY GENERAL (AG) ......6<sup>TH</sup> DEFENDANT

Dated: 27<sup>th</sup> October & 3<sup>rd</sup> December, 2021

MOLIDE MONLLINA NIVACALT

### KARAYEMAHA, J

The plaintiff in this case is a natural person residing in Mbozi. The 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants are natural persons, Police Officers and residents of Mbeya. The 4<sup>th</sup> defendant is the Regional Police Commander (herein RPC) of Songwe and the 5<sup>th</sup> defendant is the Inspector General of Police (herein IGP). The 6<sup>th</sup> defendant is the Attorney General (herein AG) who is joined to this case as the necessary party in his capacity as the Principal Legal Adviser of the Government by virtue of sections 6 (1) and 9 of the Government Proceedings Act, Cap. 5 R.E. 2002.

The plaintiff's claim against the defendants in the instant matter is founded on the allegations of malicious prosecution. The facts giving rise to the cause of action are as follows: on 26/08/2016 the plaintiff was arrested at the instance of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants as Police Officers of Songwe Region under the instructions of the 4<sup>th</sup> defendant. He was thereafter detained and tortured for 3 hours by the 1st, 2nd and 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants in a special torture room known as *Guantanamo* at Songwe Central Police. That act caused him immeasurable physical pain. After that he was taken to the 4th defendant for interrogation. It is averred further that after being interrogated, the despicable torture resumed which caused the plaintiff to run unconscious. On 28/08/2016, in a humiliating and inhuman manner, that is, having his hands and legs bound and hanged on one bar on top of the motor vehicle, was transported from FFU Camp Mbeya to Dar es Salaam and handed over to Oysterbay Police Station. It is stated further that apart from being severely injured and unable to walk due to torture, the plaintiff never received any medical attention. After all tortures and detention, on 14/09/2016 the plaintiff was charged for publication of false information through Criminal Case No. 128 of 2016 and remanded for 3 days in Songwe Prison. Later on 18/4/2017 he was acquitted of all charges on reason that the prosecution failed to prove its case.

It was contended further that defendants continued with harassment and malicious accusations as on 01/11/2017 the plaintiff was arrested once again and detained for 2 days in the police custody and on 03/11/2017 was taken to Dar es Salaam and unlawfully detained at the central police station for 21 days without bail. On return to Mbeya, fresh criminal charges were initiated at Mbozi District Court. This time around they were in respect of seditious intention. Nonetheless, the plaintiff was acquitted on 24/05/2018.

As a result of injustice occasioned on him, the plaintiff has asked this court to order the defendants pay him damages jointly and severally to a tune of Tshs. 500,000,000/=, costs for treatment to a tune of Tshs. 1,214,000/=, interest at commercial rate annually from the date the cause of action arose to the date of judgment, interest at court rate annually from the date of judgment to the date of payment in full and costs of the suit.

On the other hand, defendants have sturdily resisted the plaintiff's claims in their joint amended written statement of defence, wherein they argued that the suit by the plaintiff is not maintainable. The court has, therefore, been urged to dismiss the suit in its entirety with costs.

During the final pre – trial conference stage, it was agreed upon by the learned Counsel representing parties, that is, Mr. Aman Joachim on behalf of the plaintiff and Mr. Francis Rodgers on behalf of the defendants and approved by the court that the suit gives rise to two issues. They are:

- 1. Whether there was malicious prosecution or not.
- 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to reliefs claimed.

To prove the case, the plaintiff testified as PW1 and called two other witnesses, namely, Aizak Chingilile (PW2) and Rafii Juma (PW3).

In his evidence to establish his claims, PW1 being led by his counsel told the Court that he works as politician and a human rights activist and has been so for 10 years. Problems started in 2015 after the National Election whereby many people were arrested without justification. In order to verify names of arrestees he had, he went to police and met the RCO and his colleagues who told him that three were allowed but 100 people arrested. Thereafter, the RCO threatened him with the pistol and a statement that "tutakuonyesha, unajifanya unaongea sana." His move to alert the defendants to refrain from violating innocent people's rights triggered the RCO of Songwe to keep an eye his activities. Later, he was framed up with criminal cases, to

wit, Case No. 128 of 2016 and Case No. 144 of 2017. With regard to Criminal Case No. 128 of 2016, he said that he was arrested by the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> defendants who invaded his house, seized his mobile phone and laptop and was finally taken to the 4<sup>th</sup> defendant's office who threatened to kill him. From there he was taken to the torturing room and was severely tortured by the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> defendants. He was hand cuffed and hanged upside down. He was beaten by clubs to the extent of losing consciousness. He deposed further that instead of taking him to hospital they took him to Field Force Unit – Mbeya and exerted to further torture.

The witness testified further that from there, on 28/8/2016 was taken to Oysterbay Dar es Salaam. On their way he was tied on the car's bars and had no permit to attend the call of nature. In the next day, he was taken to Mikocheni Street interrogated while naked and tortured for almost 9 hours by police officers who were not in uniforms. After that he was taken to Oystebay Police Station and later to Mwananyamala hospital. Given his health, the police officers were advised to let him be admitted but they refused. After that he was taken back to Songwe. On 01/09/2016 he was arraigned to court and a Criminal Charge No. 28 of 2016 was leveled against him but after a full trial he was acquitted. PW1

testified adding that after that he was arrested again and taken to Dar es Salaam, tortured and ultimately charged again with Criminal Case No. 144 of 2017. After a series of adjournments (mention) the case was withdrawn.

PW1 testified further that he intended to run for a parliamentary seat and later presidency by 2030 but cases instituted against him stunned his reputation.

On cross – examination PW1 deposed that his claim of Tshs 500,000,000/= resulted from torture and imputed cases. He said that he did not have enough evidence to prove the same and had no medical receipts. He testified that he sued Police Officers who tortured him.

PW2 Aizak Chingilile testified to the effect that on 26/08/2016 was requested by the plaintiff's advocate Mr. Mwambukusi to go to Vwawa Police Station to see the plaintiff. He went there in the evening whereby he found the plaintiff moving from the police lock up to the interrogation room. He witnessed him dragging himself backward. When they got in the interrogation room, the plaintiff informed them that he was unable to stand. So he helped him to ascend on the plastic chair.

PW2 added that the charges against the plaintiff were unknown by that time. He was also told by the plaintiff that police officers who masked their faces beat him. While there, he saw the plaintiff's right leg bleeding and swollen and new wounds on his body.

On cross – examination PW2 testified that the plaintiff was tortured by people who dressed masks but did not witness that incident. He stated adding while on re – examination that the plaintiff did not tell him the number of people who tortured him.

The next witness was Rafii Juma (PW3). This witness testified that he met the plaintiff at Oysterbay police station in Dar es Salaam following his arrest for selling T-shirts branded "UKUTA". According to him, the two were arrested on political issues. While in lock up, he saw the plaintiff with wounds resulting from severe beatings. He testified further that while in lock up, he was assisting and escorting the plaintiff to go to the toilet since he was beaten by police officers. He stressed that the plaintiff was seriously injured.

On cross – examination PW3 told the court that he never witnessed the plaintiff being tortured but saw him with his three colleagues he was arrested with. According to him, he stayed with the plaintiff for more than a week.

He testified stressing on re – examination that he did not see the plaintiff being tortured but only saw him with many and severe wounds.

The evidence of the defence has come from F 6960 D/CPL Bashari (DW1), Julius Ambrose Mkama (rtd Police Officer) (DW2) and F 2820 CPL Nisile (DW3).

Being led by Mr. Tibaijuka, learned State Attorney, DW1 has told the court that he is a police officer whose duties are to conduct Cyber Crime Unit Investigation. On 23/8/2016 in the morning while online patrol visited the plaintiff's face book page and saw the text with the following words:

"Niko Kalonga nchini Malawi. Nimeamua kuja huku ili nimuoneshe Magufuli kuwa kama nimevuka haya maji hakuna askari wa kuzuia UKUTA Septemba mosi. Jiandaeni polisi uchwala, hamtutishi nawachukia sana".

The witness deposed further that the account belonged to the plaintiff because names used such as Mdude Chadema Mpaluka Said Nyagali are the ones he was always using in social media and physically in his daily undertakings. He continued testifying that the account bore Mdude Chadema's name and his photo. He confirmed before this court that he is his follower in social media hence able to read his posts.

DW1 continued testifying that on discovering these atrocious words, he downloaded the texts from face book page, printed and handed them over to Mbozi OC-CID for further steps. The witness tendered the printed texts which were admitted as exhibit D1 collectively.

DW1 testified that once again on 13/10/2017 when he was on line patrol, came across another text on the plaintiff's twitter page with the following words,

"Kuwasamehe TISS waliomshambulia Lissu sio kazi yetu ni ya Mungu. Lakini kazi ya kuwakutanisha TISS na Mungu ni yetu wenyewe wala sio ya Mungu".

To him, these words intended to break peace. He also saw the text written on 08/10/2017 on the same page going as follows:

"Askofu Pengo akija kuiona pepo mimi nakata rufaa kwenda kuzimu motoni. Kamwe siwezi kukaa peponi na kiongozi anayepotosha ukweli."

DW1 testified that these words were intending to break peace and cause harm to the society because Cardinal Pengo is a spiritual leader of the Catholic Dominion in Tanzania.

DW1 also detected another text on 6/10/2017 by Mdude Chadema @ Chadema Mdude saying,

"IGP amewataka wanasiasa kuacha kuingilia kazi ya polisi kwenye issue ya Lissu na mimi namtaka IGP asilete maneno ya siasa kwenye issue ya Lissu".

DW1 deposed that these words were dangerous to the peace of the society because the plaintiff had published lies. After all these, he recorded his statement and was informed later that the plaintiff was arrested in connection with the words he published and posted and arraigned to court at Mbozi.

The witness testified further that the plaintiff faced two different charges which involved the incidents of 23/8/2016 and 13/10/2017. The latter incident's charge was withdrawn under section 91 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act [Cap. 20 R.E. 2019] (herein the CPA) but investigation was still going on.

DW1 contested the contention by the plaintiff that he was illegally arrested, detained and maliciously prosecuted. He stated that the police force has a right to suspect any act, an obligation to investigate that act and where necessary to take the suspect to court whereby in the due course to avoid hatred or trickery. In the light of the foregoing, the

witness has urged this court to find the claims by the plaintiff frivolous and bearing no truth.

When DW1 was cross – examined by Mr. Joachim, learned counsel, he told the Court that the words posted by the plaintiff made him suspicious and forced the police force to mount investigation. When cross – examined by Mr. Shilinde, learned Counsel he said that he got information that the plaintiff was arrested but was not involved in that process.

DW2 testified being led by Ms. Masaua, learned State Attorney and told the court that on 06/08/2016 the OC-CID Mbozi, namely, SP William Mwamafupa ordered him to organized two police officers for the purpose of arresting the plaintiff for the accusations of giving false information through media. He went with CPL Misile and DC Raphael to arrest the plaintiff. They met him on his way out of his house and after stopping him, they introduced themselves. Shortly after notifying him of the offence leading to his arrest, they took him to Vwawa police station. They handed him to the charge room and reported to the OC-CID. Apart from that, DW2 did nothing more. The witness contested the plaintiff's contention that he was tortured after his arrest.

While on cross – examination by Mr. Joachim, he told the Court that he arrested the plaintiff on 28/08/2016 whereas Criminal case was filed on 13/09/2016. He has told the court that he did not know if there was extension of 20 days. He testified that the suspect is to be arrested when there is proof that he committed the offence but would depend on whether there is a need to have concrete evidence needed hence a further investigation. When he was cross – examined by Mr. Shilinde, DW2 stated that he arrested the plaintiff at the instance of the OC-CID after cyber crimes unity investigation was complete.

DW3 has a similar story to DW2. The witness, however, contested the contention by the plaintiff that he was maliciously prosecuted. He denied to have prosecuted any case against the plaintiff and pressed that it was NPS which prosecuted him. When he was cross – examined by Mr. Shilinde, the witness told the court that he complied with order of arresting the plaintiff without an arrest warrant.

Concisely, the foregoing has been the case for both sides. This court is now tasked to use the foregoing evidence above to resolve issues that were framed during the final pre-trial conference as indicated herein above. The same will be done seriatim.

The first issue is whether there was malicious prosecution or not. It has been testified on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff was arrested at the instance of the RCO SP William Mwamfupa relying on the information which he received from DW1. DW1 informed the RCO that while conducting online patrol came across the plaintiff's texts attacking TISS and Cardinal Pengo the Catholic spiritual leader, on his face book account and twitter calculated to break peace and cause tribulations to the society. The OC-CID was also informed by DW1 that the plaintiff was publishing false information against the IGP. DW1 went to the extent of printing those texts (exhibit D1 collectively) and handing them over to the OC-CID. Since in practice, Police Officers are legally bound to work on any information given to them or detected by them, I find there was justifying reasons to arrest the plaintiff. On the strength of the evidence, I hold that the arrest was lawful as it was done within the statutory duties of the RCO and his subordinates. I am now needed to answer the question whether or not after being arrested the plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted.

In their final submissions, both counsels have submitted at length regarding the issue of malicious prosecution. I have anxiously considered their rival arguments and on my part, I agree with both

learned counsels that it is now part of our jurisprudence that for the plaintiff to succeed in a case founded on the tort of malicious prosecution, has to prove the existence of four elements constituting his course of action cumulatively. One, that he was prosecuted by the defendant in criminal proceedings, two, the defendant acted without reasonable or probable cause in initiating, prosecuting and/or continuing criminal proceedings, three, the defendant acted with malice and four, the criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favour. See for instance: Hosia Lalata v Gibson Zunda Mwasote [1980] 154, Yona Ngasa v Makoye Ngasa [2006] TRL 213, James Funke Gwagilo v. Attorney General [2004] T.L.R 161 cited in Shadrack Balinago v. Fikiri Mohamed @ Hamza @ 2 others, Civil Appeal No. 223 of 2017 (unreported) and Martin Kikombe v. Emmanuel Kunyumba, Civil Appeal No. 201 of 2017 (unreported) where the Court has invariably held that to succeed in a case founded on the tort of malicious prosecution, has to prove the existence of four elements constituting his course of action cumulatively.

The plaintiff's counsels submitted in relation to the first element that the plaintiff was prosecuted through Criminal Cases No. 128 of 2016 and 144 of 2017. I agree with them. The evidence before me

indicates unblinkingly that the plaintiff was arrested by DW2 and DW3 and arraigned before the District Court of Mbozi at Vwawa on the charges of publishing false information c/s 16 of the Cyber Crimes Act No. 14 of 2015 upon a report made to OC-CID by DW1.

I again agree with both parties that after a full trial the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 128 of 2016 were terminated in favour of the plaintiff and a charge in respect of Criminal Case No. 144 of 2017 was withdrawn under section 91 (1) of the CPA. There is enough evidence proving this fact and the decision handed down by the trial magistrate on 18/04/2017 reinforces it. The same decision was admitted as exhibit P1.

Parties are locking horns on the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> ingredients. Let me start with the 3<sup>rd</sup> ingredient. The plaintiff's counsel submitted zealously that in prosecuting the plaintiff, defendants acted without reasonable or probable cause because had nothing to believe in the guilty of the plaintiff. Branding exhibits D1 collectively as mere pieces of paper with no authentication, they submitted that defendants had no other corroborative evidence to prove that it was indeed the plaintiff who posted those statements. They went further to blame the defendants for

failing to tender the plaintiff's devises seized during the arresting exercises.

On his part, Mr. Tibaijuka submitted laconically that the plaintiff failed to prove that the prosecution was conducted without reasonable and probable cause.

If I understand them rightly, the plaintiff's counsel suggest that the defendants are the ones to prove that there was reasonable and probable cause. The defendants' counsels seemingly are shifting the burden to the plaintiffs. Mr. Tibaijuka's stance that "whoever alleges must prove" is a legendary concept which is as old as the Law of Evidence in Tanzania in 1967. To put it clear, the concept connotes that the burden of proof lies to a person who asserts existence of certain facts. This is the import of section 110 (1) and (2) of the Law of Evidence Act [Cap. 6 R.E. 2019] which provides as follows:

"110 (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person".

Admittedly, the above concept is part of our jurisprudence as per the array of Court of Appeals of Tanzania's decisions in  $\it Hosia\ Lalata\ v$ 

Gibson Zunda Mwasote (supra) and Yona Ngasa v Makoye Ngasa (supra). For instance, in Yona Ngassa's case the Court of Appeal quoting Halsbury's Laws of England (3 ed) Volume 25 page 361 stated thus:

"The burden of proof in an action for damages for malicious prosecution lies in the first instance on the plaintiff. It is not sufficient for him to prove that he was innocent of the crime for which he was prosecuted by the defendant by proving that the prosecution terminated in his favour. He must show that the defendant acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause."

For decades, this has been a firm position and recently in **Shadrack Balinago v. Fikiri Mohamed @ Hamza @ 2 others** (supra) and **Martin Kikombe v. Emmanuel Kunyumba** (supra) courts have firmly held so.

On the strength of the foregoing, I am satisfied that since the plaintiff is alleging malicious prosecution he has a duty, which I am bold to hold should not be shifted, to prove that the defendants acted without reasonable or probable cause.

I have carefully studied the evidence by the plaintiff and I can conceive no reason why I should not agree with Mr. Tibaijuka that the plaintiff failed to prove the allegations. To a great extent, it is gleaned

from the plaintiff's evidence that he narrated how he was arrested, tortured, taken to Oysterbay Dar es Salaam and tortured, taken to hospital and brought back to Songwe police station. He testified further that when he was brought back to Songwe he was arraigned to court charged with Criminal Cases as shown above. Finally he was acquitted. The witness told the court adding that he was further charged with a Criminal Case No. 144 of 2017 after he was arrested at Mlowo area. In the whole, the witness' evidence is premised on the complaint that the charges preferred against him were out of trickery and hatred. In my view this piece of evidence does not at any stretch prove that the defendants acted without reasonable or probable cause when they prosecuted him.

Examining closely the defendants' evidence, I have no doubt in my mind that the plaintiff was arrested following information retrieved and printed by DW1's while online patrol. It is clear from DW1's testimony that he was a follower of the plaintiff both in the face book page and twitter hence easy to access his account and read his comments/texts. While on online patrol as an investigator in Cyber Crimes Unit on 23/08/2016 he came across statements which to him were false publications and would result in breaking peace. Caught in that belief he

reported the matter to OC-CID Mbozi. That information triggered the arrest of the plaintiff and his ultimate prosecution. In my view, I do not see any malice in what DW1 did and in what was subsequently done.

The testimony of PW1 has been exhaustively studied and combed. I have not come across where he told the court that he did not own the face book account and twitter account and that those statements were never sent by him or under his superintendence. Even if that was not true the police are mandated by law to calm the situation by curbing crimes, to investigate and when they suspect any person to have committed an offence to arrest and cause him arraigned to court. In that sense, they are the country's fore-eyes in detecting crimes, investigating them and arresting whoever is associated with the said crimes and have him prosecuted. In the present case, they had every authority and mandate in acting in the manner they did. Since the plaintiff is questioning their reasonability in taking actions, he is to prove that they acted unprofessional, unlawfully and had no reasonable and probable cause in so doing.

From the foregoing discussion, it is my considered view that the information was reasonably found on the plaintiff's pages of face book and twitter and would result in breach of peace. In those circumstances

DW1 rightly reported the threats to OC-CID Mbozi and that what he saw was genuine not actuated by malice.

The plaintiff's counsels had another string to their bow. They submitted that the instituted criminal cases were terminated in favour of the plaintiff. To them that was enough to intimate malicious prosecution as against the plaintiff. If I may respectfully say so, the argument is, I think, an attractive one. I do not think, however, that it is valid in law. In my opinion it does not matter in whose favour the case was terminated favour. What matters, I think, is whether the plaintiff has been able to prove that he was maliciously prosecuted which as shown above he has miserably failed. To put in clear way, I wish to be guided by the wisdom of Court of Appeal of Tanzania in *James Funke Ngwagilo v. Attorney General*, [2004] TLR 161, where it was held that:

"It is enough if the defendant believes that there is reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution for one to prove that there was justification for the prosecution. Certainly, the burden lay with the appellant to prove the absence of reasonable and probable cause in the prosecution."

The above said whether there were technical errors in complying with section 18 of the Cyber Crimes Act or not, in as long as DW1 felt

likelihood of breach of peace in the statements published by the plaintiff he had a reasonable or probable cause to act as he did. In similar vein, the remaining defendants had reasonable or probable cause to prosecute the plaintiff; if at all that was the case. In the circumstances any reasonable and objective person would think that there was a reasonable and probable cause for prosecuting the plaintiff. It is significant that on the evidence on record, the contentions by the plaintiff and on his behalf stand unassailable.

I shall next consider the element of malice. The plaintiff was contended that the defendants were actuated by malice when they set the legal machinery into motion. In his evidence PW1 told the court that when he got in the RPC's office he was threatened by a gun and his acts of leaving the office only to park the Government motor vehicle at his shop are indicators of malice. Let me pause here and say a word. On examining the evidence, it is not firmly stated that there were areas in Mbozi reserved for parking Government motor vehicles. If that is the situation, I think that contention is weak and cannot be acceptable at all.

Reverting to the specifics, in *James Funke Ngwagilo* (supra), this Court defined malice thus:

"Malice in the context of malicious prosecution is an intent to use the legal process for some other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose. The appellant could prove malice by showing, for instance, that the prosecution did not honestly believe in the case which they were making, that there was no evidence at all upon which a reasonable tribunal could convict, that the prosecution was mounted for a wrong motive and show that motive. "[Emphasis added]

In the instant case, the evidence before me and which I have reviewed earlier on how and why the prosecution against the appellant was mounted is a far cry from proof that the prosecution was instituted for a purpose other finding and punishing the culprit that published false information. The fact the plaintiff had published the false statement which would result in breaching was an obvious basis for apprehending and investigating him as a suspect. The appellant may have been prosecuted by the respondents and subsequently acquitted for the prosecution failure to prove the charge beyond reasonable double (in Criminal Case No. 128 of 2018) and discharged upon the Director of Public Prosecution entering *nolle prosequi*, (in Criminal Case No. 144 of 2017) but I am firm to hold that the defendants set the legal machinery against the plaintiff with reasonable and probable cause and were not actuated by malice. The plaintiff had to prove malice by showing that the prosecution did not honestly believe in the case which they were making, that there was no evidence at all upon which a reasonable District Court could convict, that the prosecution was mounted for a wrong motive and show that motive. Sadly, he failed to prove as was legally required. In the end, I am comfortable to hold that the claim for malicious prosecution is without merit.

Apart from that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he was severely tortured, treated in hospital and incurred some costs.

In view of my determination on the first issue against the plaintiff, the second issue is naturally rendered without substance. In consequence, I dismiss the plaintiff's case with costs.

It is so ordered.

Dated at MBEYA this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of December, 2021

J. M. Karayemaha

JUDGE

Date: 03/12/2021

Coram: P. R. Kahyoza, DR

Plaintiff: Absent

For the Plaintiff: Mr. Stewart Ngwale, Advocate. Holding brief of Mr.

Aman Joachim, Advocate

1<sup>st</sup> Defendant: 2<sup>nd</sup> Defendant:

3<sup>rd</sup> **Defendant:** Absent

4<sup>th</sup> Defendant: 5<sup>th</sup> Defendant:

6<sup>th</sup> Defendant:

For Defendants: Mr. Joseph Tibaijuka, State Attorney

**B/C:** Sarah A. Mungure

# Mr. J. Tibaijuka, State Attorney:

This matter is scheduled today for judgment. We are ready to receive it.

## Mr. Stewart Ngwale:

We are ready too.

Court:

Judgment delivered in the presence of Mr. Stewart Ngwale, Advocate, holding brief of Mr. Aman Joachim, counsel for the plaintiff; but also in the presence of Mr. Joseph Tibaijuka, State Attorney appearing for all the defendants; while both the Plaintiff and Defendants are absent, this 3<sup>rd</sup> December,

2021

P. R. Kahyoza DEPUTY REGISTRAR 03/12/2021