## IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA LABOUR DIVISION AT DAR ES SALAAM

## **MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 272 OF 2021**

**VERSUS** 

RULING

28th April & 18th May 2022

## Rwizile, J

This application is for extension of time. The applicants are applying for enlargement of time to file an application for revision to challenge the decision of the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA).

The applicants were employed by the respondent as security guards and on 14<sup>th</sup> March 2017 were terminated. Following this termination, which they considered unfair, they instituted Labour Dispute No. CMA/DSM/KIN/R.1006/2017 against the respondent. The award was in favour of the respondent.

Again, they were aggrieved by decision of CMA. But due to the procedure obtaining in this court, they were to first filed a representative suit.

They successfully applied for leave which was granted on 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 2021, hence this application.

The application is supported by the affidavit of Alexander Bonifasi Masasi.

The respondent filed counter-affidavit to oppose the same. The application is based on the following issues;

- a) Whether the applicant has good reason for extension of time to be granted.
- b) Whether the applicant filed an application for representative suit.

The hearing of this application was by way of oral submissions. The applicants were represented by Saulo J. Kusakalah learned Advocate, whereas the respondent was represented by Flora Jacob, learned Advocate.

Mr. Kusakalah argued that the reason for delay was because of the application complying with a legal requirement of first filing a representative suit, before filing the application. He said, when the same was granted on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2021. This application was then filed on 10<sup>th</sup> August 2021. He therefore prayed for the application to be granted.

Miss Flora in reply, argued that the reasons given are not sufficient since the applicants did not account for each day of delay. She continued to state that the award was delivered on 29<sup>th</sup> April 2019 and they were served with the same on 30<sup>th</sup> April 2019. She further submitted that the application for leave was filed for the second time. The first was No. 382 of 2019 which was filed on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2019, 8 weeks and 3 days from the date of service. This, the learned advocate added is contrary to section 91(1) of Employment and Labour Relations Act

She continued to state that the same was struck out and another one was filed, which is Application No. 225 of 2020 and leave was granted on 23rd June 2021. It was her argument further that this application was filed on 10th August 2021 after one month and six days from the date, leave was granted. He said, this is not proper and fetched support from the cases of **Esio Nyomolelo and Fikiri Nyomolelo v Republic**, Criminal Application No. 11 of 2015 and **Paul Martin v Bertha Anderson**, AR Civil Application No. 7 of 2005 at page 6-8 where in both cases, it was stated that gaps during the period of prosecuting a matter in Court must be accounted for. He cited the case of **Sebastian Ndaula v Grace Rwamafa**, Civil Application No. 4 of 2014 at page 8. She then stated that the delay was due to negligence and inaction on party of the applicant as

held in the case of **Jireys Nestory Mutalemwa v Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority**, Miscellaneous Labour Application No.

270 of 2013 at page 14. She prayed, the application to be dismissed.

In a rejoinder, Mr. Kusakalah submitted that the application for a representative suit had to be filed first. He said, a representative suit as a legal requirement is provided for under Rule 44(2) of the Labour Court Rules and so, they were delayed because of it.

Going through the submissions of the parties, the Court is called upon to determine if there is sufficient reason for delaying to warrant extension of time.

It is true that according to Rule 44(2) of the Labour Court Rules, G.N No. 106 of 2007, requirement of filing a representative suit is apparent. It is because the law so demands when there is more than one applicant. The law states as hereunder;

"Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in a suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court appear and be heard or defend in such dispute, on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested, except that the Court shall in such case give at the complainant's expenses, notice of the

institution of the suit to all such persons either by personal service or where it is from the number of persons or any other service reasonably practicable, by public advertisement or otherwise, as the Court in each case may direct."

Section 91(1)(a) of the Employment and Labour Relation Act [CAP. 366 R.E. 2019] provides for Revision of arbitration awards. It states that: -

91(1) Any party to an arbitration award made under section 88(10) who alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings under the auspices of the Commission may apply to the Labour Court for a decision to set aside the arbitration award-

(a) Within six weeks of the date the award was served on the applicant unless the alleged defect involves improper procurement;"

From the provisions of the law, it is clear that the application for revision of the CMA award is within six weeks. In this application the applicants are praying for extension of time to challenge the CMA decision dated 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2019, which was served to them on 30<sup>th</sup> April, 2019. As submitted, they first filed an application for representative suit No. 382 of 2019 on 28<sup>th</sup> June, 2019, which was nearly two months thereafter.

They filed another application for representation, Application No.225 of 2020, which was granted on 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 2021. Not until on 10<sup>th</sup> August, 2021, when this application was filed. Counting from when the application for a representative suit was granted, it also took 48 days to take action. Even though Rule 56(1) of Labour Court Rules [G.N. No. 106 of 2007] provides for the Court to have discretionary powers to extend time, but it should be done upon good cause to be shown, which states.

"The Court may extend or abridge any period prescribed by these Rules on application and on good cause shown, unless the Court is precluded from doing so by any written law."

This was also stated in the case of **Wambura N.J. Waryuba v The Principal Secretary Ministry for Finance and Another**, Civil

Application No. 320/01 of 2020, it was held that: -

"... it is essential to reiterate here that the Court's power for extending time... is both wide-ranging and discretionary but it is exercisable judiciously upon cause being shown."

In the case of Lyamuya Construction Company Ltd V. Board of Registered Trustee of Young Women's Christian Association of

**Tanzania**, Civil Application No. 2 of 2010 (unreported) the following principles to be considered as good cause were laid down: -

- 1. The delay should not be inordinate
- 2. The applicant should show diligence and not apathy, negligence or sloppiness in the prosecution of the action that he intends to take;
- 3. If the Court feels that there are other sufficient reasons such as the existence of a point of law of sufficient importance, such as the illegality of the decision sought to be challenged.

Based on the above cited authorities, I consider a delay of 48 days from the day the representative suit was granted to the date this application was filed is not inordinate. Therefore, this application has merit and it granted. The applicants are given 14 days to take necessary action. I make no order as to costs.

TANIA \*

A.K. Rwizile

**JUDGE** 

18.05.2022