Lugakingira, J.: This was a suit founded on tort, it being alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant unlawfully attached his cattle in execution of a decree passed by the District Court of Dodoma in Criminal ICase No. 122 of 1981, to which he
A (the plaintiff) was not a party. The question posed by this court and argued this morning was whether the plaintiff should not have proceeded by way of objection in the court which ordered the attachment.
B Mr. Alimwike who appeared for the plaintiff argued that the attachment was unlawful and a trespass since the warrant of attachment was directed to one Sasine Mnama, the accused in Cr. Case No. 122 of 1981, and not the plaintiff. He said, therefore, that there was no warrant of attachment as far as the C plaintiff's cattle were concerned and therefore no need to object to the court which issued the warrant. The defendant who appeared in person countered this by saying that the cattle he attached were in fact those of the judgment - debtor, Sasina Mnama, and that they were handed to him by the plaintiff. He was surprised that the plaintiff had since changed his mind on the matter.
D I am aware that a person may bring a fresh suit where he could also have proceeded by way of objection. This is not a statutory rule but it seems to be accepted in practice. That being so, it means that the court is vested with discretion to entertain or not to entertain a suit which could have been brought by E way of objection, depending on the circumstances of each case. The circumstance of this case do not reveal any grounds upon which it would be more to the advantage of the parties nor that justice would be better served for this court to take over a matter in which the District Court has jurisdiction by way of objection. Whether the plaintiff was named in the warrant of attachment or not is beside the point. The F statutory rule is that any person aggrieved by the execution of a decree may object to the court which passed the decree and that covers the plaintiff.
There should also be some order and sanity in the institution of proceedings. Where a matter has started G in one court it is proper for that matter and the resultant effects to be concluded in that court.
If anyone is still aggrieved, there is of course a right of appeal. But for a higher court to take up such a matter directly just because practice permits it, is to import disorder in the administration of justice and I am H personally not prepared, where I can help it, to be a party to such disorder.
In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that Mr. Alimwike has raised sufficient grounds upon which to dispense with the jurisdiction of the Court which ordered the attachment. I also think that in the circumstances of this case, the matter can only be properly and speedily dealt with by the District Court, I and full justice can only be obtained there. I say that full justice can only be obtained there
because if the plaintiff were to succeed in this court, and an order were made for the restoration of the A cattle, the defendant would have to go back to the District Court to obtain another warrant of attachment. This Court cannot issue one. If the plaintiff thinks he can succeed, therefore, let him succeed in the District Court which also has the power to bring the matter to a logical conclusion. B
For these reasons, the suit is struck out. The plaintiff is at liberty to proceed by way of an objection in the District Court. I make no order as to costs since this matter was raised by this court.
Suit dismissed. C