Mapigano, J.: The appellants are dissatisfied with the decision of the principal resident magistrate at Kisutu titled Ruling/order and dated 11/2/85, refusing C their application for temporary injunction, and have come to this court. Mr. Rainthatha representing the respondent has taken a preliminary point namely that the memorandum of appeal is incompetent in that it is not accompanied by a copy of the order appealed from as required by the provision of 0.40 r.2. C.P.C. (as read together D with 0.39 r. 1 C.P.C.) He has urged this court to strike out the appeal and cited the decision in Kotak's case  E.A. 348 which he said is on all fours with the present appeal.
0.39 r.1 is framed in imperative terms. It imposes a mandatory and not a directory requirement that every memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a copy of the E decree appealed from. 0.40 r.2 assimilates the provision of 0.39 r.1 and read mutatis mutandis it says that in the case of an appeal from an order the memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a copy of the order appealed against. By section 3 C.P.C. order is the formal expression of the decision of the court. It is now settled by several F judicial pronouncements, too many to mention, that the attachment of a copy of the order appealed from is absolutely essential and that where the appellant has failed to comply with the provision of 0.40 r. 2 the appeal is not properly before the Court and must be dismissed. G
Responding, Mr. Marando counsel for the respondent submitted that the Ruling which is attached to the memorandum of appeal is essentially an order or incorporates the order appealed from and sufficiently meets the requirement of 0.40 r.2. He made reference to the decision of this Court in Warsama & Mohamed v Ibarahim  H.C.D. 78. H
In the case just mentioned the appellant obtained an order from the trial court for vacant possession of their premises. They then duly commenced execution and had the Court Broker extract shs.1,972/= from the occupant, the respondent, who happened to be not the tenant. The respondent objected to the execution and it seems the issues were: I (a) whether the respondent was a statutory tenant; (b) whether the decree
1985 TLr p147
passed against the respondent was enforceable against him; and (c) whether the sum of A shs.1,972/= paid to the Court Broker was refundable to the respondent. In its Ruling the trial court answered all these issues in the affirmative. On appeal to the High Court at Arusha against that decision, the respondent argued as a preliminary point, relying on Kotak's case, that the memorandum of appeal having been filled without a separate B copy of the order appealed from, the appeal was incompetent, notwithstanding that a copy of the Ruling was attached.
Kwikima Ag. J. was of the opinion that there was no need to draw a separate order, because, he stated, purporting to distinguish Kotak's case, the learned magistrate had C incorporated the order in his Ruling which stated at the bottom paragraph that "in the whole therefore, I rule that the objector is a statutory tenant of the suit premises and the decree passed against the judgment-debtor is not enforceable against him and that the payment of shs.1,972/= paid to the Court Broker as a result of the attachment levied by him should be refunded to the objector". D
With due respect to the learned acting judge, I fail to see on what material respects that case was distinguishable from Kotak's case. In actual fact it was also the appellant's argument in Kotak's case that the copy of the Ruling contained also a copy of the order and the late Hamlyn, J. implicitly accepted the respondent's contention that an order is a E separate entity which has to be abstracted from the Ruling, supplied and exhibited. I think the provision of 0.40 r. 2 is plain and clear. It contemplates a separate copy of the order appealed from.
I can hardly imagine a comprehensive Ruling that does not contain answers or decisions F on the points raised in an application, and as we know, the summary of those answers are often to be found at or towards the end of the Ruling and are the very stuff by which the order that has to be drawn is constituted. If therefore Mr. Marando's argument is valid then the provision of the rule under consideration will be rendered trifling if not G nugatory. I understand that procedural rules are intended to serve as the handmaidens of justice and not to defeat or frustrate it, and it cannot be denied that the strict application of the rule in question may in certain cases amount to a mere legal formalism. However, I do not feel that I have a mandate to disregard the omission to attach a separate copy of the order to the memorandum of appeal. H
In the event, the preliminary point is sustained and the appeal is dismissed. The respondent will have his costs in this court.
Delivered before the advocates.
I Order accordingly.