Korosso, J.: This revisional file was ordered to be opened with a view to satisfying A this Court as to the legality or propriety of the learned Principal District Magistrate order dated 27/3/1991 in which he dismissed the charge and discharged the Accused for failure by the prosecutor to file a certificate of the Regional Crimes Officer, Shinyanga, asking for an adjournment of the case for a further aggregate period of 60 days as B provided under the provisions of section 225 (4) of the CPA No. 9/85.
Mr. Oswald, the learned State Attorney, who represented the Republic at the hearing of the revision, submitted that the initial 60 days having not elapsed, the learned trial Magistrate was not legally justified in dismissing the charge and discharging the C Accused.
Indeed, the learned State Attorney, is right. The Accused had the charge formally read over to him on 31/1/1991 so that on 27/3/1991 when the charge was dismissed, there had elapsed 55 days or so in the aggregate. Self-evidently, the order was made prematurely. The discharge of the Accused was consequently illegal and the order a D nullity.
Be as it may, the learned trial Magistrate needs to be commended for being so mindful about the magnitude of the provisions of section 225 (4) of the CPA. There can be no room for compromise in the application of section 225(4) of the CPA. I may further E observe that in the application of the provisions of section 225 (4) (a) of the CPA, the Court has a discretion to refuse to adjourn the case even where a certificate has been filed by the Regional Crimes Officer if satisfied that the certificate has not been able to F show an existence of a real need for an adjournment or the grounds are unreasonable. Take this case in point as an example. The Accused was charged with the offence of giving false information to Mr. Magige, the Primary Court Magistrate at Bumela Primary Court on 14/90. In a case of this nature the said Magistrate was the only key witness. G It is difficult to really believe that it was not possible to secure the attendance of the Primary Court Magistrate, working in the same District before the District Court.
There may also arise a situation where all the witnesses but one have testified. If the Court honestly believes that the evidence of the remaining witness will be just like "a H fly on the coach-wheel', so that the case is bound to stand or fall on the evidence given thus far, it will be doing justice to the case to refuse the application. The position under the provisions of section 225 (4) (b) and (c) of the CPA has no relevancy to my foregone observations for under those I
paragraphs (b) and (c) adjournment is obligatory once appropriate certificates are A filed on time.
I would emphasize here that the provisions of section 225(4) (a) (b) and (c) of the CPA are essentially intended to control the speed of hearing criminal cases so that proceedings are concluded within ascertainable period of time. The section is just like B a reins which a rider uses to control the direction and speed of an unruly horse.
The final question is whether or not this Court should order the arrest of the Accused so that the proceedings resume from where they stopped. C
I find myself overwhelmed by reluctance as a result of my surprise I expressed 'supra' because of the prosecution's failure to secure the attendance of Mr. Magige, the Primary Court of Bumela Primary Court, for 55 days.
Under the circumstances of this case, it would be violating the provisions of Article 13 D (6) (b) of the Constitution of 1977.
Consequently, I invoke the inherent powers of this Court by dismissing the charge and discharging the Accused.
E The Lower Court's order is quashed.
F
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